Tactical Masterclass: Manchester United 2007/08

Manchester United are one of the biggest clubs in the world. With a semblance of victory, and a filled out trophy cabinet to back that statement up - it was the 2007/08 season in which United were utterly dominant; winning the Premier League and Champions League.

Amongst a number of factors that could be pinned to this success, it’s Ferguson’s tactical acumen that shines through most prominently. Ironically, 4-4-2 was the main tactic of the 1990’s and was abandoned due to the formation being exploited via a three-man midfield, which was quickly rising in popularity.

Importance of Personnel

United’s deadly forwards

It goes without saying, the importance of players who possess attributes such as versatility and high work rates in both attack and defense is huge. This can be seen within Leicester City’s emphatic triumph, during the 2015/16 season.

Of course, when deciding on a set formation, you’re aided by the types of players who make up your squad. This is why the 4-4-2 formation was so accustomed for a team that boasted the likes of hard working, versatile players such as; Cristiano Ronaldo, Wayne Rooney, Carlos Tevez and Ji-Sung Park - with the latter often falling victim to under appreciation.

Understandably, with a back five that consisted the likes of; Edwin Van Der Sar, Patrice Evra, Nemanja Vidic, Rio Ferdinand and Wes Brown - United possessed arguably the greatest defense of all time - with an incredibly low total of 22 goals conceded across the entire season, and an astonishing 21 clean sheets!

But it was the way that they functioned in Ferguson’s set-up that allowed them to flourish as a team.

Paul Scholes (left) and Michael Carrick (right)

Tactical Masterclass

Due to the implementation of two holding players in the form of Paul Scholes and Michael Carrick, the traditional box-to-box role was rendered useless in this set-up. Whilst Carrick was utilised as a deep lying playmaker, it was Scholes who functioned as an advanced playmaker - sitting a little further up from Carrick, occupying a free-roam role, to an extent.

The two holding players were accompanied by a right midfielder in the form of either Owen Hargreaves or Ji-Sung Park, who was instructed to function as an almost inverted winger, with the objective of acting as an unconventional right midfielder, sitting narrower to add coverage to the central midfielders. Perhaps this tactical decision is the most significant, due to the role it plays in achieving balance for the team overall.

As for the striker, there was no recognised number 9 - at the time. Ronaldo was considered as a winger, whilst both Rooney and Tevez acted as second strikers. Again, with the high work rates and versatility that the duo possessed, it meant that they would act as deep-lying strikers - allowing United to work the opposition in such a way, that they could be counter-pressed due to the space created behind the opposition’s high defensive line. It also meant that the Red Devils’ midfield was not often over-encumbered, even against a five-man midfield.

Just the implementation of these tactics within the strike-force and midfield alone, allowed for such a diverse and penetrable attack. With (primarily) Ji-Sung Park helping out Carrick and Scholes - as well as the deep-lying strike force also putting in a shift, it meant that Ronaldo could progress higher up the pitch - replicating that of a total football 4-3-3 formation, when United were on the attack.

Whilst the midfield and forward players assisted in absorbing pressure further up the pitch, the backline was playing their part brilliantly. The philosophy similar to total football, that was allocated further up the pitch, didn’t escape the backline.

With Ferdinand acting as a higher pressing centre back, Vidic operated as the team’s bruiser. In this role, he would typically win the ball with a strong tackle, or take out his man if it was required.

At the position of full-back, it was Patrice Evra and Wes Brown - who although in a similar role, offered different functions. Whilst Brown was the more traditional full-back, sitting deeper and concentrating on defensive duties, Evra operated further up the flank, operating as a wing-back and allowing for width on the left side - as Ronaldo drifted inside. Through Evra’s ability to execute this role so well, it meant that United always had an option out-wide on the left, as Ronaldo progressed further up the pitch.

Arguably the greatest Manchester United side to exist, the functionality throughout each position and tactical awareness to execute a formula that enabled aspects of total football was second to none.

It’s fair to say, Sir Alex Ferguson’s 2007/08 team was most certainly a tactical masterclass.

Manchester United - Champions League Winners 2008